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Value Creation in a
Credit Card Portfolio
A. CHARLENE SULLIVAN
DEBRA DRECNIK WORDEN

In

these times of upheaval in the banking industry, managers are increasingly likely to question whether their business units create value
for shareholders. Industry analysts have argued
that once a bank identifies pieces of its retail sector which add or dilute value for its shareholders, it can forge a strategy for each business unit
that has a good chance of succeeding.! However,
measuring the shareholder-value-creation
potential of a business unit or product forces the
retail banker to think about performance in new
and sometimes confusing ways. Traditional measures of performance do not correlate with market value measures. High interest rate margins
and earnings per share do not necessarily add up
A. Charlene Sullivan is associate professor at Purdue University.
Debra Drecnik Worden is adjunct professor at Olivet Nazarene University.

to high stock prices. As the standards for performance measurement in banking shift to return
on equity, adjusted for risk, bankers are discovering "some fascinating facts about their business mix."2
The purpose of this analysis is to discover the
"facts" about the mix of behavioral types in a
credit card portfolio and the way mix impacts
shareholder value." We disaggregated the portfolio of standard credit cards of a large regional
bank into segments which are defined in terms of
the way the cards were used in 1988. The annual
profitability of each segment, measured in terms
of after-tax return on equity, is estimated. In addition, the performance of a small sample of premium cards is analyzed. The analysis provides
insights into the "value drivers" in the portfolio
and the value-creation
potential of new-card
marketing and pricing programs.
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If managers want to determine the value created by a particular lending function, they estimate its incremental cash flows, the amount of
the shareholders' investment, and the shareholders' required rate of return. With these data,
the managers can determine shareholder value,
which is net present value minus allocated capital.
Leemputte and Kearney describe a process for
estimating the break-up value or net present value of an existing retail banking business unit.
Another method for analyzing the value creation
aspects of a lending activity is to estimate the
risk-adjusted rate of return on equity capital invested. The amount of equity invested is that required to shield the lender from unexpected
losses in the loan portfolio, losses that are not
provided for by the regular loss reserve. The
capital allocation for unexpected losses may
vary across segments of a loan portfolio and can
greatly exceed the bank's overall capital-to-assets ratio.
In this analysis of the risk-adjusted return on
equity of a standard credit card portfolio, the
portfolio was divided into segments defined in
terms of the way the cards were used during the
year, the size of credit lines, and the age of the
accounts. For each segment, total gross income
was determined by summing the actual total interest paid during the year, all annual fees, interchange income, and delinquency and overlimit charges paid by each account.
Interest and noninterest charges for servicing
the accounts were deducted from total gross income. Both charges were estimated as a percentage of the average balance of each account during the year. The interest expense was set equal
to 8%, the-average two-year constant-maturity
Treasury bond rate during the analysis year
(1988). In the calculation, the interest expense
charged to each account was adjusted to reflect
the fact that the account was partially funded by
interest-free equity.

Pricing Covers Average Losses
For banks of comparable asset size, total operating expenses for the credit card function were
5% of outstandings in 1988. This figure was used
in the estimation of operating expenses attributable to each account in the portfolio. Also sub-
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tracted from gross income were actual chargeoffs in 1988. The result of these calculations is
cash income before taxes.
Theoretically, loans will be priced high enough
to allow the lender to cover his expected chargeoffs. The role of the equity capital is to protect
the lender from unexpected losses for given
types of loans. Prudent credit risk management
procedures require that the lender underwrite
each loan type or segment of the portfolio with
capital equal to a measure of unexpected losses
for the relevant class of loans. Following the
methodology described by Rose, we set the capital allocation for each segment of the portfolio
based on the standard deviation of the distribution of actual chargeoff losses for that segment.
Due to data limitations, the amount of unexpected losses was based on experience for only one
year. Ideally, the unexpected loss risk would be
measured over a number of years.

The Benefits of Diversification
This capital allocation does not define the optimal leverage for a bank seeking to satisfy the
"worst case" requirement for equity funding.
Rose argued that if loan losses were distributed
normally, the allocation of risk capital equal to
two standard deviations of losses would cover
the bank against unexpected losses about 98% of
the time, provided the future replicated the past.
But two times the standard deviation of loan
losses may overestimate unexpected losses since
losses across various segments are probably not
perfectly correlated. Given the extent of geographic and demographic diversification in most
credit card portfolios, we would allocate capital
equal to one standard deviation of the mean loss
experience.
In the final calculation of the after-tax return
on equity, the average income earned for each
segment of the portfolio was adjusted by a 40%
tax factor and divided by the allocated capital
amount for that segment. The resulting risk-adjusted rate of return was then compared with
the hurdle rate of the bank to determine whether
the business justified tying up shareholders'
funds. We assumed that the after-tax hurdle rate
for bank equity in 1988 was 15%.
The analysis was performed using a sample of
credit card accounts randomly selected from the
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population of active accounts in the portfolio of
a large midwestern commercial bank. The portfolio contained accounts representing
households from every region of the country but was
concentrated in the Midwest. The data base included the date the account was opened and all
account activity for 1988. All accounts included
in the sample were open before 1988 and were
active during the year, but could have been
closed or charged off by year end. Segments of
the portfolio were defined in terms of how the
accounts had been used in 1988.

Incorporating Delinquencies
While the allocation of risk capital for each
segment of the card portfolio was derived from
an assessment of the risk of unexpected loss in
that segment, or the standard deviation of the
distribution of 1988 charged-off dollars, other
more traditional measures of account risk were
included in the summary statistics for each segment but were not included in the calculation of
net income for each segment.
These risk measures were (a) percent delinquent - the proportion of the 1988 account life in
which a payment was past due for at least 30
days; average value for all accounts, and (b) percent overlimit - the percent of the 1988 account
life in which an outstanding balance exceeded
the approved line of credit; average value for all
accounts in the segment.
Measures of account activity provided for
each segment were the average percent of the total credit line used during the year (1988 average balance/credit line), and the average percent
of the 1988 account life that a balance was
revolved.
Institutional Pricing. The method by which the
cards are priced obviously has a profound impact on the rate-of-return analysis. The pricing
schedule for this portfolio was similar to that for
the bulk of bank credit cards outstanding in
1988. The majority of the accounts were standard Visa and MasterCard cards with an annual
fee of $12 or $15 and an annual percentage rate
of 16.8% on cash advances and 19.8% on merchandise purchases. The issuer provided a 30day grace period on all merchandise purchases,
but not on cash advances. The premium cards in
the sample had an adjustable interest rate with

an annual fee of $35. For all accounts, the late
fee and the overlimit fee were $10 per incident.
In the analysis, the merchant interchange fee
was 1.3% of total merchandise purchases.
The Return on Equity for the Portfolio. The
bank credit card industry defined its profitability targets for credit card portfolios in terms of
the after-tax return on assets. The American
Bankers Association's 1989 Credit Card Report
indicated that medium-size banks ($300 million
to $1 billion in assets) had an average after-tax
return-on-assets
target of 1.2%, while banks
above $1 billion in assets set that target at
3.11%. Others have estimated that commercial
banks had an after-tax hurdle rate of return on
equity of 15% to 20% during 1988. At a tax rate
of 40%, the portfolio analyzed here produced an
after-tax return on assets of 2.58% and an aftertax return on equity (ROE) of 12.05%.
The disappointing level of equity returns is directly attributable to the large capital allocation
for unexpected losses, which equaled 35% of average account balances - a staggering yet, for
this year, a correct figure. Most banks would, of
course, require less equity and therefore may
have acceptably profitable returns. In this year,
however, the portfolio was not creating shareholder value for this institution. Let us now proceed to an analysis of the profitability of discrete segments of the portfolio.

Value Creation - Revolvers vs. Convenience
Users. Most cards are priced so that the cardholder may avoid paying interest if the entire
balance is paid within the grace period. Thus,
only those cardholders who actually revolve a
balance pay interest. The profitability of a credit
card portfolio depends vitally on the mix of revolvers and nonrevolvers. In 1988, 58.'5% of this
sample paid interest at some time during the
year. This is comparable to industry figures that
indicate that about 60% of account holders in
1988 revolved.
The standard accounts in the sample were segmented into four groups based on the proportion
of times the balance was revolved in 1988. (See
Table 1.) While it is desirable to increase revolver activity from an income-generating point of
view, the data in Table 1 indicate that all measures of credit risk increase in proportion to the
amount of time a customer revolves. And, as
would be expected, the amount of allocated capi-
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Table 1: Card Use Performance of Customers, Classified According to Percent of Time Revolving
Characteristic

% Credit Line Used
% Of 1988 Account Life Revolved
% 1988 Account Life Delinquent
% 1988 Account Life Overlimit
% Accounts Charged Off in 1988
Standard Deviation of $ Char~eoffs
efore-Tax Net Income $
After-Tax Return on Equity %

Percent of 1988 Account Life Revolved
0

1-25%

26-75 %

>75%

6.2
0
1.6
0.3
1.1

9.0
14.2
~.9
0.1
0

19.4
52.9
5.1
1.1
2.1

51.7
98.1
13.1
5.6
2.5

127.04
7.91
3.75

0
16.11
NA

201.96
30.87
9.17

306.7
92.42
18.08

N= 7528, Arithmetic Mean Values

tal required to hedge against unexpected losses,
which is the standard deviation of chargeoff
losses, also increases as the accounts are more
heavily revolved. However, only the heavy-revolver segment of the portfolio (more than 75%
percent of the year) produced sufficient cash
flow to justify the capital required, given the
risk of the segment. (The allocated capital for
the second group was zero because there were no
chargeoffs, eliminating the possibility for calculating a ROE. However, average income for these
accounts was positive.) The performance measure for the other two segments indicates that
shareholder value is actually being destroyed,
given the current pricing strategy for credit
cards.
The analysis of return on equity suggests a
need for repricing credit card services for nonrevolvers. Many in the industry would argue that
the activity of the nonrevolver reduces the average cost of all transactions, generating higher
profitability for the entire portfolio. Some might
argue that the nonrevolver account is also a lowcost account to service because of its limited
bad-debt and collection expenses. However, the
average balance for the nonrevolver segment
was only one-eighth the size of that of the heavyrevolver segment. As the operating costs were
assigned in proportion to average balances, the
ROE figures for each segment already incorporate the operating costs that are associated with
the nonrevolving segment.
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Ways to increase nonrevolver profitability include raising the annual fee, assessing a pertransaction charge, increasing the interchange
rate, and eliminating the grace period. In the current competitive environment, none of these alternatives would seem palatable. But if shareholder-value
creation
is the objective,
nonrevolvers must either be shifted to debit
cards (with lower unexpected losses) or charged
fees high enough to reduce their drag on overall
profitability
Value Creation - High-Balance Revolvers. The
previous analysis argues for the targeting of active revolvers to improve the value-creating potential. But some banks have identified cardholders who revolve a large percentage of their
credit line as high-risk and have thus terminated
such accounts. To assess the validity of such a
strategy in a risk-adjusted-return
framework,
accounts that revolved a balance more than 75%
of the time were segmented into two groups those that revolved less than one-half of their
available -credit line and those that revolved
more than half. (See Table 2.)
All measures of credit risk were dramatically
higher for the "high-balance revolver." The capital allocation for this segment was more than 10
times higher than that for the low-balance revolver, while the income derived from the highbalance revolver was only 50% greater .. Nevertheless, the ROE for the high-balance revolver
was acceptable.
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It is clear from these data that efforts to reduce loss uncertainty from high-balance revolvers, perhaps through closer monitoring of credit
limits, should improve risk-adjusted profitability. However, indiscriminate termination of these
accounts is probably not a good idea.
The Risk-Adjusted Return on Premium Cards.
Premium credit cards were an important innovation of the last five years. These cards generally
offer a high credit limit, a relatively low or adjustable interest rate, and a high annual fee relative to that charged for standard bank cards.
One would expect credit standards to be stricter
for premium cards, and the lower interest rate
should be attractive to those intending to use the
card for credit, not convenience. As a result, the
premium card segment should produce a high
risk-adjusted rate of return.
The performance of the premium accounts in
the sample was compared with that for standard
accounts with similarly high credit lines ($5,000
or more). The summary statistics are presented
in Table 3. As expected, premium cardholders
were more likely to revolve a balance and used a
higher percentage of the available credit line
than did standard cardholders. However, all the
risk measures for the premium cards exceeded
those for the standard ones, and the standard deviation of losses was more than twice as high.
The risk-adjusted return on equity for the premium card was well below the hurdle rate (only

Table 2: Differences in Card Use Performance
Between "High-Balance" and "Low-Balance"
High Revolvers
Accounts Revolving> 75%
of 1988 Account Life,
Average Balance as
Percentage of Credit Line
Characteristic

<50%

>50%

% Credit Line Used
% of 1988 Account Life Revolved
% 1988 Account Life Delinquent
% 1988Account Life Overlimit
% Accounts Charged off in 1988
Standard Deviation of $ Chargeoffs
Before-Tax Net Income $
After-Tax Return on Equity %

28.4
97.0
5.3
0.4
0.4
35.71
72.94
122.55

72.3
99.2
19.6
10.0
3.8
397
106.72
16.01

N=2346, Arithmetic Mean Values

9%). In contrast, standard accounts with large
credit lines provided a return that was above the
hurdle rate (nearly 17%).
The inferior performance of the premium card
program may be attributed to a difference in the
age of accounts. Banks generally do not offer a
high credit line to a standard cardholder unless
he is a very good credit risk or is a long-standing
customer. The low credit risk measures in the
standard card segment may simply reflect the effects of account aging. In fact, the average age of
the premium accounts was 19 months, while that
for the standard high-balance accounts was 64
months.
Thus, while the ROE for the premium cards
was disappointing, it is possible that a portfolio
of "aged" premium cards might be as profitable
as one of standard cards with high credit lines.
The following section provides more information
on the relationship between the age of the account and profitability.

Risk-Adjusted

Returns by Age of Account.

Card issuers have generally observed a relation-

Table 3: Comparison of Premium and Standard
Cardholders with Lines of Over $5,000
Characteristic
% Revolve
% Credit Line Used
% of 1988 Account Life Revolved
% of 1988 Account Life Delinquent
% 1988 Account Life Overlimit
% Accounts Charged Off in 1988
Standard Deviation of $ Chargeoffs
Before-Tax Net Income $
After-Tax Return on Equity %
Number

Premium

Standard

72.3
26.2
50.0
6.7
1.0
1.0
381.29
57.33
9.0
329

44.9
14.5
22.0
2.9
0.3
0.9
163.62
45.71
16.76
363

Arithmetic Mean Values

ship between account age and the incidence of
credit difficulty. Lenders expect delinquency
rates for new accounts to peak in their second
year. To isolate the impact of account age, the
portfolio was segmented into four groups on the
basis of age of account and age of cardholder.
Accounts for cardholders aged 26 to 55 - stable
and high-credit-using types - were divided into
four groups, as shown in Table 4.
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Tible 4: 'erformlnce of Cardholders Aged 26 to 55, by Age of Account
Age of Account
Characteristics
Revolw
Credit LiM UMd·
of 1'" Accoutlt L.iflRevolved
1918 Account Life Delinquent
Account LiM CNlrlimit
Accounts Charged Off in 1988
Standard Deviation of $ Chargeoffs.
Before-Tax Net Incomt $
After-Tax ReMn on Equity %

<12 Months

13-24 Months

59.7
30.3
27.0
10.0
5.9
2.6

78.4
37.0
57.8
11.1
7.0
4.8

70.7
30.2
49.8
9.3
3.3
2.5

72.5
27.8
48.1
5.5
1.6
0.4

127.08
6.42
3.03

349.16
41.14
7.07

277.52
44.42
9.61

103.71
47.50
27.36

%
%
%
%
%
%

25-60 Months >60 Months

N=2128, ArithmetiC Mean Values

All measures of risk peak at the 13-to-24
month age group, including the measure of unexpected losses. The risk-adjusted return increased with account age but did not exceed the
hurdle rate until the accounts were more than 60
months old.
These data suggest the high~return potential
of programs for retaini~ existing accounts. In
their concentration on JM)rtfctlio growth through
new account 8OlieitatiOtt;eaHiHuers have, in all
likelihood, dramatically redUted their return on
equity. In contrast, those who cultivated their
existing accounts may have created more shareholder value, albeit with lower portfolio growth.
Note that the increased value of the mature account derives primarily from the lower amount
of equity required to hedge unexpected losses. In
an analysis of commercial loans, Rose found that
investment-grade "blue chip" loans provided the
highest return on equity for a similar reason.
The objective of bank managers is to create
shareholder value in each product or function of
the bank. To doless is to invite failure. However,
most managers are not accustomed to measuring
the value-creating potential of bank products.
Using a methodology described by Rose, we calculated the risk-adjusted after-tax return on equity for segments of a credit card portfolio.
While the overall portfolio provided an attractive return on assets, the return on allocated equity was below the hurdle rate, probably be-
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cause the variance of losses in this particular
year was unusually high.
Segmentation of the portfolio provided evidence that, on average, accounts that did not revolve a balance at least 75% of the time destroyed shareholder value. However, among
high revolvers, those who revolved less than
half their credit lines were sensationally profitable, while those revolving more than half their
lines exceeded the bank's hurdle rate by only one
point. Further, premium cards earned a return
well below the average for the portfolio and dramatically lower than the return provided by
standard cards with similarly high credit limits.
The weak performance of the premium card segment appeared to reflect the low average age of
accounts. Our final segmentation revealed that
the risk-adjusted return increased with the age
of the account, but was above the hurdle rate
only for those accounts that were more than five
years old.
The analysis demonstrates that the strategy of
offering large credit lines at low fees and rates to
cardholders who have not absolutely demonstrated their creditworthiness causes high unexpected losses without offsetting income growth.
But programs designed to retain existing accounts are likely to add considerable value to the
portfolio. This profitability analysis does not
provide justification for cracking down on those
who revolve a high percentage of their lines
most of the time.
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To build value, credit card portfolio managers
must consider the implications of their strategies for both income and unexpected losses. As

all credit card portfolios are not the same, the results of this analysis may not be generalizable,
but the value of the insights gained is clear.

Notes
1. Patrick J. Leemputte and Mary E. Kearney. "Where is
the Value Created in your Retail Business?" Journal of Retail
Banking, Vol. 12 (Winter 1990-91), 7-18.
2. Sanford Rose. "Higher Returns Possible from the Blue
Chips." American Banker, Jan. 30, 1991, p.l
3. Michael C. Lenora. "Segmenting Credit Cardholders by
Behavior." Journal of Retail Banking, Vol. 13 (Spring 1991),
19-23, contains a discussion of behavioral types in a credit
card portfolio.
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